frame f , it is governed by a comparison of
(the worker's anticipated payoff if he does not opt out immediately) and βV (x * , 1 − τ (x * )) − γ (his anticipated payoff if he opts out immediately). Plainly, if the max term in the first expression equals its second element, he will not opt out. Accordingly, he opts out iff
When the opt-out decision is made in a forward-looking frame f , it is governed by a comparison of
(the worker's anticipated payoff if he does not opt out immediately) and βV (x * , 1 − τ (x * )) − βγ (his anticipated payoff if he opts out immediately). Once again, if the max term in the first expression equals its second element, he will not opt out. Accordingly, he opts out iff
Inattentiveness. For our model of inattentiveness, each frame specifies not only factors that influence attention, but also a status quo bundle. For opt-out choices, the contribution rate for the status quo bundle coincides with the default. When the opt-out decision is made in a frame f (for which the status quo contribution rate is d), it is governed by a comparison of V (d, 1 − τ (d)) and V (x * , 1 − τ (x * )) − (γ + χ(f )). Consequently, the worker opts out iff ∆(d) ≥ γ + χ(f ).
Anchoring. With anchoring, when the opt-out decision is made in the frame f , it is governed by a comparison of V (d, 1 − τ (d) , d) and V (x * (f ), 1 − τ (x * (f )) , f ) − γ. Consequently, the worker opts out iff ∆(d, f ) ≥ γ. With naturally occurring institutions,
Additional technical assumptions
For the purpose of stating our additional technical assumptions, we make the dependence of V (and hence of x * ) on preference parameters, θ, explicit. We assume that V is strictly quasiconcave in (x, z), strictly increasing in both x and z, with lim z→0 V (x, z, θ) = −∞ and lim z→∞ V (x, z, θ) = +∞, and continuously differentiable (except at z = 0). 6 We allow the preference parameters ξ ≡ (γ, θ) ∈ [0, γ] × Θ ≡ Ω to differ across workers and use H to denote their CDF. 7 Except where stated otherwise, we assume H has full support on Ω and γ is very large, so that the fraction of individuals opting out of any default lies strictly between 0 and unity. We take Θ (and hence Ω) to be compact. We assume τ is strictly increasing, piecewise linear, continuous, and convex. Under our assumptions, the ideal point x * (θ) is unique and varies continuously with θ. We assume that the (induced) distribution of x * (θ) has full support on [0, x] , with atoms at 0, x, and the kink points of τ (if any), but nowhere else, 8 and that the density is bounded at all other points.
For all models with frame-dependent weighting, we assume that the mapping D is the same for all workers. For the models of naive time inconsistency and attention, we posit the 6 When extending the model to anchoring, we make the same assumptions conditional on each frame f . 7 Notice that we treat γ rather than some previously suppressed argument of u as the preference parameter governing opt-out costs; this is valid as long as we take the opt-out technology as fixed.
8 This reasonable property can be derived from more primitive assumptions about the distribution of θ and the properties of V , but the associated technical issues do not illuminate the problem of interest. For the anchoring model, we make the same assumption about x * (θ, f ) for each f .
existence of some frame f either most conducive to naivete or least conducive to attention, and assume that, for any default d, the set of workers opting out has positive measure even with f .
For the model with anchoring, we assume for some purposes that an increase in f weakly shifts the individual's choices toward higher x (monotonicity). Formally, if u(e, θ) +
, where x > x and z < z , then u(e, θ)
Proofs
The proofs of the theorems stated in the main text make use of the following notation. As in BR, we define a generalized choice situation (abbreviated GCS), G = (X, f ) as a constraint set X paired with a psychological frame f . 9 A choice correspondence C maps GCSs to the available alternatives the individual is willing to choose. We use G * to denote the domain of the choice correspondence, and G ⊆ G * to denote the welfare-relevant domain.
Proof of Theorem 1
Let m denote a monetary transfer, and let X(m) and f denote the individual's opportunity set and decision frame, respectively. For any alternative bundle x,
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EV A (x) = inf {m | yP * x for all m ≥ m and y ∈ C(X(m ), f )} and
. Choose any ε > 0. By definition, yP * i z for all m ≥ EV Ai (z) + ε and y ∈ C(X(m ), f ). Thus, by transitivity, yP * i x for all m ≥ EV Ai (z)+ε and y ∈ C(X(m ), f ), which implies EV Ai (x) ≤ EV Ai (z). Similarly, by definition, xP * i y for all m ≤ EV Ai (x)−ε and 9 Bernheim and Rangel (2009) used the term "ancillary condition" rather than psychological frame. 10 The definitions given here are special cases of the definitions in Bernheim and Rangel (2009) , in that here the alternative to the status quo is a specific bundle x, rather than an alternative opportunity set. y ∈ C(X(m ), f ). Thus, by transitivity, zP * i y for all m ≤ EV Ai (x)−ε and y ∈ C(X(m ), f ), which implies EV Bi (z) ≥ EV Bi (x).
Next choose any x ∈ X M . If x is a weak generalized Pareto optimum we are done, so suppose it is not. Consider the (necessarily) non-empty set U = {y ∈ X | yP * i x for all i}. Choose any individual j and consider some z and f such that (U, f ) ∈ G and z ∈ C j (U, f ).
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We claim that z is a weak generalized Pareto optimum in X. If it were not, then there would be some w such that wP * i z for all i. By the transitivity of P * i , we would then have w ∈ U , which contradicts z ∈ C j (U, f ) (because in particular wP * j z ). From our first step, we then have
Proof of Theorem 2
For workers who choose the default, let m 0 (d, θ) be the solution to:
Also let m 1 (θ, γ, f ) be the solution to:
where D(0) = β −1 and D(−1) = 1. Our assumptions on V guarantee existence and uniqueness of the solutions, as well as continuity of the resulting functions. Plainly,
in z) and a maximum, v H , on that domain.
Define Q(d, f ) as the set of values of (θ, γ) for which the worker elects the default; i.e., (θ, γ) such that
or equivalently
Aggregate worker surplus is given by:
Only the second term, which measures the incremental benefit received by workers who elect the default, varies with d. Thus the worker-surplus maximization problem is:
Let φ(x) denote the fraction of individuals for whom x * (θ) = x. Under our assumptions, φ(x) is strictly positive for x ∈ A and zero otherwise. Let φ * ≡ max d∈A φ(d).
Consider any d ∈ A. For any individual with x * (θ) = d, we have
It follows that
Consequently, we have
Now consider any d / ∈ A. From equations (1) and (2), we see that, for all (γ, θ) ∈ Q(d, f ),
(where we have used the fact that V (x
Consequently,
where Q(d, f, γ) ⊂ Θ denotes the opt-in set for a fixed value of γ, and where we have used the fact that an increase in γ expands the set of opt-ins.
Now suppose the theorem is false. Then there is some sequence H γ k with γ k → 0 and γ k /γ k > e * > 0, and an associated sequence of optimal defaults
Plainly, from (4) and (5),we must have, for all k,
Accordingly, we will introduce a contradiction by demonstrating that
We claim that, with a fixed opt-out cost of
We prove this claim in four steps.
Step 1: With a fixed opt-out cost of γ k and a default of
Because x * (θ) is continuous and Θ compact, we know that {θ | x * (θ) ≤ d * − ε} is compact. Thus, we can define
Furthermore, because x * (θ) is unique, we necessarily have ϑ L > 0 (otherwise we would have
Step 1 then follows from the fact that there
Step 2: With a fixed opt-out cost of γ k and a default of
The proof mirrors that of Step 1. The set {θ | x * (θ) ≥ d * + ε} is also compact, so we
and observe that ϑ H > 0.
Step 2 then follows from the fact that there exists
Step 3: With a fixed opt-out cost of
Consider a worker for whom
, we also have
To see why, let q ∈ (0, 1) satisfy qx
, and define
, z, θ, 0). Combining these inequalities yields (7). Combining (6) and (7), we obtain
which implies that the worker opts out of d, as desired.
The case of any worker for whom x * (θ) ≥ d * + ε is completely analogous, but employs
Step 2 instead of Step 1.
Step 4: Now we prove the claim. Because
we see that for k > K ε , with a fixed opt-out cost of γ k and a default rate of d k , all workers for whom
Having established the claim, we now complete the proof of the theorem. If d * / ∈ A, then the measure of workers with ideal points in (d * − ε, d * + ε), call it y(ε), converges to zero along with ε. But plainly y(ε) 
With opt-out choices made in the forward-looking frame, EV A is the value of m F A that satisfies
Thus we have
with strict inequality when ∆(d) = γ. It follows that, for those who change their choices, 12 Recall that for this model, EV A is assessed in the forward-looking frame.
Likewise, with opt-out choices made in the contemporaneous frame, EV B is the value of
With opt-out choices made in the forward-looking frame, EV B is the value of m F B that satisfies
with strict inequality when ∆(d) = β −1 γ. It follows that, for those who change their choices, 
where the second equality follows from ∆(d) ≥ γ. With opt-out choices made in any forward-looking frame, EV A is the value of m F A that satisfies
Recall that for this model, EV B is evaluated in the contemporaneous frame. 14 Recall that for this model, EV A is assessed in a maximally naive forward-looking frame. 
It follows that, for those who change their choices, m
γ], and m 
With opt-out choices choices made in maximally attentive frames, EV A is the value of m A A that satisfies
Thus we have 
With opt-out choices made in maximally attentive frames, EV B is the value of m A B that satisfies
Proof of Theorem 4
With zero opt-out costs, EV evaluated in frame f is given by the value of m satisfying
where x 0 is the baseline contribution rate. Because V is strictly increasing in z, the value of d that maximizes the RHS also maximizes EV evaluated in frame f . By definition, the 17 Recall that for this model, EV B is assessed in maximally inattentive frames for which the baseline is the status quo.
Next we show that EV , evaluated from the perspective of frame f , is non-decreasing for d < f and non-increasing for d > f . First observe that, as a consequence of our monotonicity assumption,
is non-decreasing in x for x < x * (f ) and non-increasing in x for x > x * (f ). To see why,
consider any x , x with x > x ≥ x * (f ). Let z = 1 − τ (x ), z = 1 − τ (x ), and
Because V is quasiconcave,
Because τ is convex,
Combining these inequalities, we have
as desired. An analogous argument establishes the same inequality for x < x ≤ x * (f ).
Third, it follows as a consequence of the first two steps that V (x
Now suppose all choices are deemed welfare-relevant. Consider part (i). From the first part of the proof, we know that, for every worker, the best outcome from the perspective of frame f is achieved by setting d = f . Because this model satisfies the multi-self conditions, the best option for worker i from the perspective of any frame f is unimprovable according to P * i . It follows immediately that every default rate d is a weak generalized Pareto optimum. Now we turn to part (ii). Consider two frames, f and f , with f > f . Suppose
. Equivalent variation assessed from the perspective of f , call it m f , satisfies
By monotonicity, we have
Defining m f as equivalent variation from the perspective of frame f , it follows immediately that m f > m f . Therefore, with x 0 < x * (d), EV A is assessed from the perspective of frame f = x, and EV B is assessed from the perspective of the frame f = 0. An analogous argument implies that, with x 0 > x * (d), EV A is assessed from the perspective of frame f = 0, and EV B
is assessed from the perspective of the frame f = x. Part (ii) then follows directly from the first portion of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5
Throughout this proof, we use i to denote a particular worker. BR define the relation shows the overall opt-out frequencies as functions of the default rate for decisions made in the naturally occurring and alternative frames with an employee match; Figure A .12 shows the same opt-out frequencies without an employee match.
